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Microcredit seeks to promote business growth and improve well-being by expanding access to
credit. We use a field experiment and follow-up survey to measure impacts of a credit expansion for
microentrepreneurs in Manila. The effects are diffuse, heterogeneous, and surprising. Although there
is some evidence that profits increase, the mechanism seems to be that businesses shrink by
shedding unproductive workers.  Overall, borrowing households substitute away from labor (in both
family and outside businesses), and into education. We also find substitution away from formal
insurance,
along with increases in access to informal risk-sharing mechanisms. Our treatment effects are
stronger for groups that are not typically targeted by microlenders: male and higher-income
entrepreneurs. In all, our results suggest that microcredit works broadly through risk management
and investment at the household level, rather than directly through the targeted businesses.
Keywords: microfinance, microcredit, microentreprenuership, risk sharing, formal and informal
finance
JEL Codes:O1, D1, D2, G2  3
Microfinance is a proven and cost-effective tool to help the very poor lift themselves out of 
poverty 
and improve the lives of their families (Microcredit Summit Campaign)
1 
 
It is easy to construct examples where… the mere possibility that a new outsider might enter 
the market can crowd-out existing local contracting, leading to the possibility of a decline in 
welfare 




Microcredit is an increasingly common weapon in the fight to reduce poverty and promote 
economic growth. Microlenders typically target women operating small-scale businesses and 
traditionally uses group lending mechanisms. But as microlending has expanded and evolved 
into what might be called its “second generation,” it often ends up looking more like 
traditional retail or small business lending: for-profit lenders, extending individual liability 
credit, in increasingly urban and competitive settings.
2 
The motivation for the continued expansion of microcredit, or at least for the continued 
flow of subsidies to both nonprofit and for-profit lenders, is the presumption that expanding 
credit access is a relatively efficient way to fight poverty and promote growth. Yet despite 
often grand claims about the effects of microcredit on borrowers and their businesses (e.g., the 
first quote above), there is relatively little convincing evidence in either direction. In theory, 
expanding credit access may well have null or even negative effects on borrowers. Formal 
sector access could crowd-out relatively efficient informal credit and insurance mechanisms 
(see the second quote above). The often high cost of microcredit (60% APR in our setting) 
means that high returns to capital are required for microcredit to produce improvements in 
tangible outcomes like household or business income.
3 Empirical evaluations of microcredit 
impacts are typically complicated by classic endogeneity problems; e.g., client self-selection 
and lender strategy based on critical unobserved inputs like client opportunity sets, 
preferences, and risks.
4 
We generate clean variation in access to microcredit by working with a lender to randomly 
                                                 
1 http://www.microcreditsummit.org/index.php?/en/about/microfinance_advocacy/ . 
2 See Karlan and Morduch (2009). 
3 There is also some evidence that psychological biases can lead to “overborrowing” that does more harm than 
good; see Zinman (2009) for a brief review. 
4 Prior studies have used various methodologies to address endogeneity problems; see, e.g., Coleman (1999), 
Kaboski and Townsend (2005), McKernan (2002), Morduch (1998), Pitt et al (2003), and Pitt and Khandker 
(1998). One newer study of note examines the intensive impact margin of a government program, by using a 
program in Thailand that delivered a fixed amount of money to a village regardless of the number of individuals 
in the village (Kaboski and Townsend 2009).   4
approve some microenterprise loans within a pool of marginally creditworthy, first-time 
applicants. We then use an extensive follow-up survey to measure a wide range of impacts on 
households and their businesses.   
The setting for our study is very much second generation microcredit: individual liability 
loans, delivered by First Macro Bank (“FMB,” or the “Lender”), a for-profit lender that 
operates in the outskirts of Manila and receives implicit subsidies to expand access to 
microentrepreneurs from a USAID-funded program (e.g., in the form of technical assistance).
5 
Our study is the first randomized evaluation with such a firm, and complements a 
contemporaneous randomized evaluation of group lending in urban Indian slums by the non-
profit microfinance institution Spandana (Banerjee et al. 2009), and our earlier study of 
expanding access to consumer loans in South Africa (Karlan and Zinman forthcoming). 
The expansion we study changed borrowing outcomes, despite the existence of other 
formal and informal borrowing options in the markets where the expanding lender operates. 
“Treated” applicants (those randomly assigned a loan) significantly increase their formal 
sector borrowing. There is no evidence of significant effects on informal borrowing, but the 
point estimates are negative. The effects on total borrowing (sum of all types of formal and 
informal) are not significant but consistent with effect sizes on the order of the increases we 
find in our more precise estimates on formal borrowing. 
The impacts of FMB’s credit expansion on more ultimate outcomes are varied, diffuse, and 
surprising in many respects. Business investment does not increase; rather, we find some 
evidence that the size and scope of treated businesses shrink. We do find some evidence that 
profits increase, at least for male borrowers, and the mechanism seems to be that treated 
businesses shed unproductive employees. One explanation is that increased access to credit 
reduces the need for favor-trading within family or community networks. This hypothesis is 
consistent with other treatment effects that are consistent with less short-term diversification 
and hedging, better access to risk-sharing, and more long-term investment in human capital. 
The likelihood of other household members working (either in family or outside businesses) 
falls, as does the likelihood of someone working overseas. The use of formal insurance falls, 
while trust in one’s neighborhood and access to emergency credit from friends and family 
increase (i.e., microcredit seems to complement, not crowd-out, informal mechanisms). The 
likelihood of a household member attending school increases. We find no evidence of 
                                                 
5 The program is administered by Chemonics, Microenterprise Access to Banking Services (MABS).   5
improvements in measures of self-reported well-being; if anything, the results point to a small 
overall decrease. 
In all, we find that increased access to microcredit leads to less investment in the targeted 
business, to substitution away from labor and into education, and to substitution away from 
insurance (both explicit/formal, and implicit/informal) even as overall access to risk-sharing 
mechanisms increases. Thus although microcredit does have important— and potentially 
salutary— economic effects in our setting, the effects are not those advertised by the 
“microfinance movement”. Rather the effects seem to work through interactions between 
credit access and risk-sharing mechanisms that are often viewed as second- or third-order by 
theorists, policymakers, and practitioners. At least in a second-generation setting, microcredit 
seems to work broadly through risk management and investment at the household level, rather 
than directly through the targeted businesses. 
A final set of key findings suggests that treatment effects are stronger for groups that are 
not typically targeted by microcredit initiatives: male, and relatively high-income, borrowers. 
The gender split is interesting because although microlenders typically target female 
entrepreneurs, recent evidence finds higher returns to capital for men (de Mel, McKenzie, and 
Woodruff 2008; de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff forthcoming). The income split is 
interesting because many consider poverty targeting an important criteria for microfinance 
(e.g., USAID has a Congressional requirement to allocate a proportion of funding to programs 
that reach the poor). Although we do not address the question of whether microcredit can help 
the poorest of the poor — our sample frame are microentrepreneurs, but wealthier than 
average for the Philippines — the fact that we find little evidence of effects on those with 
lower-income within our sample frame does not bode well for arguments that impact is biggest 
on those who are poorer. The overall picture of our results also questions the wisdom of 
targeting microentrepreneurs to the exclusion of “consumers,”. Money is fungible, and we find 
that entrepreneurs do not necessarily invest loan proceeds in growing their businesses. 
Limiting microcredit access to entrepreneurs may forgo opportunities to improve human 
capital and risk-sharing for non-microentrepreneurs (Karlan and Zinman forthcoming finds 
direct evidence that salaried workers benefit from microloans). 
 
II. Market and Lender Overview 
Our cooperating Lender, First Macro Bank (FMB), has operated as a rural bank in the 
Metro Manila region of the Philippines since 1960. Filipino “microlenders” include both for-  6
profit and nonprofit lenders offering small, short-term, uncollateralized credit with fixed 
repayment schedules to microentrepreneurs. Interest rates are high by developed-country 
standards: FMB charges 63% APR on its standard product for first-time borrowers. There is 
also a similar market segment for consumer loans. 
Most Filipino microlenders operate on a small scale relative to microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) in the rest of Asia,
6 and our lender is no exception. FMB maintained a portfolio of 
approximately 1,400 individual and 2,000 group borrowers throughout the course of the study. 
This portfolio represents a small fraction of its overall lending, which also includes larger 
business and consumer loans, and home mortgages. 
Microloan borrowers typically lack the credit history and/or collateralizable wealth needed 
to borrow from traditional institutional sources such as commercial banks. This holds for our 
sample-- which is only marginally creditworthy by the standards of a microlender, as detailed 
in Section III— despite the fact that our subjects are better educated and wealthier than 
average. Table 1 provides some demographics on our sample frame, relative to the rest of 
Manila and the Philippines. 
Casual observation suggests that many microentrepreneurs in our study population face 
binding credit constraints. Credit bureau coverage of microentrepreneurs in the Philippines is 
quite thin, so building a credit history is difficult for poor business owners and consumers. 
Informal credit markets and serial borrowing from moneylenders charging 20% per month or 
more is common (e.g., more than 30% of our sample reported borrowing from moneylenders 
during the past year). Trade credit is quite uncommon. There are several microlenders 
operating in Metro Manila, but most MFIs operate on a small scale (as noted above) and 
charge high rates (see below). 
The loan terms granted in this experiment were the Lender’s standard ones for first time 
borrowers. Loan sizes range from 5,000 to 25,000 pesos, which is small relative to the fixed 
costs of underwriting and monitoring, but substantial relative to borrower income. For 
example, the median loan size made under this experiment, 10,000 pesos (US$400) was 37% 
of the median borrower’s net monthly income. Loan maturity is 13 weeks, with weekly 
repayments. The monthly interest rate is 2.5%, charged over the declining balance. Several 
upfront fees combine with the interest rate to produce an annual percentage rate of around 
                                                 
6 In Benchmarking Asian Microfinance 2005, the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) reports that Filipino 
microlenders have the lowest outreach in the region – a median of 10,000 borrowers per MFI.   7
60%.
7 
The Lender conducted underwriting and transactions in its branch network. At the onset of 
this study, FMB changed its risk assessment process from one based on weekly credit 
committee meetings to one that utilized computerized credit scoring. 
Delinquency and default rates are substantial. 19.0% of the loans in our sample paid late at 
some point, and 4.6% were charged off.  
 
III. Methodology 
Our research design uses credit scoring software to randomize the approval decision for 
marginally creditworthy applicants, and then uses data from household/business surveys to 
measure impacts on credit access and several classes of more ultimate outcomes of interest. 
The survey data is collected by a firm, hired by the researchers, that has no ties to the Lender. 
 
A. Experimental Design and Implementation 
i. Overview 
We drew our sample frame from the universe of several thousand applicants who applied 
at eight of the Lender’s nine branches between February 10, 2006 and November 16, 2007.
8 
The branches are located in the provinces of Rizal, Cavite, and the National Capital Region. 
The Lender maintained normal marketing procedures by having loan officers canvass public 
markets and hold group information sessions for prospective clients. 
Our sample frame is comprised of 1,601 marginally creditworthy applicants, nearly all 
(1,583) of whom were first-time applicants to the Lender. Table 1 provides some summary 
statistics, from application data, on our sample frame. The table shows that our sample is 
largely female (85%), has a typical household size, and is relatively well-educated (93% 
graduated high school or more) and wealthy compared to local and national averages (average 
household income of $770 per month). The most common business is a sari-sari (small 
grocery/convenience) store. Other common businesses are food vending, and services (e.g., 
auto and tire repair, water supply, tailoring, barbers and salons). Table 1 does not contain 
sample means for each dependent variable we use for measuring impact of access to 
microcredit; these means can be found in the tables on treatment effects. 
                                                 
7 The Lender also requires first-time borrowers to open a savings account and maintain a minimum balance of 
200 pesos.   
8 One branch was removed from the study when it was discovered that loan officers had eliminated the 
randomization component of the credit scoring software.   8
The Lender identified marginally creditworthy applicants using a credit scoring algorithm 
that places roughly equal emphasis on business capacity, personal financial resources, outside 
financial resources, personal and business stability, and demographic characteristics. Credit 
bureau coverage of our study population is very thin, and our Lender does not use credit 
bureau information as an input into its scoring. Scores range from 0 to 100, with applicants 
scoring below 31 rejected automatically and applicants scoring above 59 approved 
automatically. Our 1,601 marginally creditworthy applicants fall into two randomization 
“windows”: low (scores 31-45, with 60% probability of approval, N =256) and high (scores 
46-59, with 85% probability of approval, N = 1,345). Only the Lender’s Executive committee 
was informed about the details of the algorithm and its random component, so the 
randomization was “double-blind” in the sense that neither loan officers (nor their direct 
supervisors) nor applicants knew about assignment to treatment versus control. 
Table 2 corroborates that the random treatment assignments generated observably similar 
treatment and control groups. In total, 1,272 applicants were assigned to the treatment (loan 
approval) group, leaving 329 in the control (loan rejection) group. 
The motivation for experimenting with credit access on a pool of marginal applicants is 
twofold.  First, it focuses on those who are targeted by initiatives to expand access to credit. 
Second, (randomly) approving some marginally creditworthy applicants generates data points 
on the lender’s profitability frontier that will feed into revisions to the credit scoring model. 
This allows the lender to manage risk best, by controlling the flow of their more marginal 
clients in terms of creditworthiness. 
 
ii. Details on Experimental Design and Operations 
Our sample frame and treatment assignments were created in the flow of the Lender’s three-
step credit scoring process (summarized in Figure 1). 
First, loan officers screened potential applicants on the “Basic Four Requirements”: 18-60 
years old; in business for at least one year; in residence for at least one year if owner or at least 
three years if renter; and daily income of at least 750 pesos.  2,158 applicants passed this 
screen. 
Second, loan officers entered household and business information on those 2,158 into the 
credit scoring software, and the software then rendered its application disposition within 
seconds. 391 applications received scores in the automatic approval range. 166 applications 
received scores in the automatic rejection range. The remaining 1,601 applicants had scores in   9
one of the two randomization windows (approve with 60% or 85% probability), and comprise 
our sample frame. 1,272 marginal applicants were assigned “approve”, and 329 applicants 
were assigned “reject”. The software simply instructed loan officers to approve or reject— it 
did not display the application score or make any mention of the randomization. Neither loan 
officers, branch managers, nor applicants were informed about the credit scoring algorithm or 
its random component. 
The credit scoring software’s decision was contingent on complete verification of the 
application information, so the third step involved any additional due diligence deemed 
necessary by the loan officer or his supervisor. Verification steps include visits to the 
applicant’s home and/or business, meeting with neighborhood officials, and checking 
references (e.g., from other lenders). If loan officers found discrepancies they updated the 
information in the credit scoring software, and in some cases the software changed its decision 
from approve to reject (nevertheless in all cases we use the software’s initial assignment, from 
Step 2, to estimate treatment effects). In other cases applicants decided not to go forward with 
completing the application, or completed the application successfully but did not avail the 
loan. 
In all, there were 351 applications assigned out of the 1,272 assigned to treatment that did 
not ultimately result in a loan. Conversely, there were 5 applications assigned to the control 
(rejected) group that did receive a loan (presumably due to loan officer noncompliance or 
clerical errors). Table 3 shows all of the relevant tabs, separately for each randomization 
window. In all cases we use the original treatment assignment from Step 2 to estimate 
treatment effects; i.e., we use the random assignment to loan approval or rejection, rather than 
the ultimate disposition of the application, and thereby estimate intention-to-treat effects. 
As detailed in Section II, the loans made to marginal applicants were based on the Lender’s 
standard terms for first-time applicants. Loan repayment was monitored and enforced 
according to normal operations. 
 
B. Follow-up Data Collection and Analysis Sample 
Following the experiment, we hired researchers from a local university to organize a 
survey of all 1,601 applicants in the treatment and control groups.
9  The stated purpose of the 
survey was to collect information on the financial condition and well-being of 
                                                 
9 Midway through the survey effort, Innovations for Poverty Action staff replaced the survey firm’s management 
team but retained local surveyors.   10
microentrepreneurs and their households. As detailed below, the surveyors asked questions on 
business condition, household resources, demographics, assets, household member 
occupation, consumption, well-being, and political and community participation. 
In order to avoid potential response bias in the treatment relative to control groups, neither 
the survey firm nor the respondents were informed about the experiment or any association 
with the Lender. Surveyors completed 1,113 follow-up surveys, for a 70% response rate. Table 
2, Column 2 shows that survey completion was not significantly correlated with treatment 
assignment. 
Ninety-nine percent of the surveys were conducted within eleven to twenty-two months of 
the date that the applicant entered the experiment by applying for a loan and being placed in 
the pool of marginally creditworthy applicants. The mean number of days between treatment 
and follow-up is 411; the median is 378 days; and the standard deviation is 76 days. 
 
C. Estimating Intention-to-Treat Effects 
We estimate intention-to-treat effects for each individual outcome Y using the 
specification: 
(1)   Y
k
i = α + β
kassignmenti +  δriski + φAPP_WHENi + γSURVEY_WHENi + εi 
k indexes different outcomes— e.g., number of formal sector loans in the month before the 
survey, total household income over the last year, value of business inventory, etc.-- for 
applicant i (or i’s household). Assignmenti = 1 if the individual was initially assigned to 
treatment (regardless of whether they actually received a loan). Riski captures the applicant’s 
credit score window (low or high); the probability of assignment to treatment was conditional 
on this (set to either 0.60 or 0.85, depending on their credit score), and thus it is necessary to 
include this as a control variable in all specifications.  APP_WHEN is a vector of indicator 
variables for the month and year in which the applicant entered the experiment and 
SURVEY_WHEN is a vector of indicator variables for the month and year in which the survey 
was completed. These variables control flexibly for the possibility that the lag between 
application and survey is correlated with both treatment status and outcomes.
10 We estimate 
(1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) unless otherwise noted. 
 
                                                 
10 This could occur if control applicants were harder to locate (e.g., because we could not provide updated contact 
information to the survey firm), and had poor outcomes compared to the treatment group (e.g., because they did 
not obtain credit).   11
IV. Results 
A. Reading the Treatment Effect Tables 
Tables 4 through 11 present our key estimated treatment effects on borrowing, business 
outcomes, and other outcomes. Each table is organized the same way, with each row an 
outcome or summary index of related outcomes, and each column either the full sample or a 
subsample. Each cell presents the intention-to-treat effect on that outcome or index, i.e., the 
coefficient on a variable that equals one if the applicant was randomly assigned to receive a 
loan. We also present the (sub)-sample mean for the outcome in each cell, in brackets, for 
descriptive and scaling purposes. 
Each column presents results for a different (sub)-sample. Column 1 uses the full sample, 
and columns 2 through 5 use sub-samples based on gender and income, since these 
characteristics are commonly used for targeting microcredit. For the income sub-samples we 
use a measure taken by the Lender at the time of application (i.e., at the time of treatment, not 
at the time of follow-up outcome measurement). 
 
B. Impacts on Borrowing Levels and Composition, Table 4 
Table 4 presents the estimated treatment effects on various measures of borrowing. The 
key questions here are whether being randomly assigned a loan from our Lender affects 
overall borrowing, and borrowing composition. Ex-ante the impacts are not obvious, given the 
prevalence of other lenders in the market as described in Section II. 
The first panel of Table 4 shows large increases in borrowing on loan types plausibly most 
directly affected by the treatment: loans from the Lender, or from close substitutes.
11 The 
probability of having any such loan in the month before the survey increases by 9.6 percentage 
points in the treatment relative to control group, on a sample mean of only 14.5 percentage 
points. The total original principal amount of loans outstanding increase 2,156 pesos. This is a 
large effect in percentage terms (83% of the sample mean) and equates to about $50 US or 
10% of our sample’s monthly income. The number of loans increases by 0.11, a 72% increase 
of the sample mean of 0.15. 
The second panel of Table 4 presents results on overall formal sector borrowing. There is 
                                                 
11 We define "close substitutes" to the treating lender as loans in the amount of 50,000 pesos or less (since the 
treating lender did not make loans larger than 25,000 pesos to first-time borrowers), from formal sector lenders 
with no collateral or group requirements that listed as either a rural bank or microlender by the MIX Market 
and/or Microfinance Council of the Philippines.    12
no significant effect on any reported borrowing in the month before the survey,
12 but amount 
borrowed and the number of loans increase by roughly the same amount as in the first panel. 
This suggests that increases in formal sector borrowing are driven entirely by loans like the 
Lender’s, and that the treatment did not crowd-in other types of formal sector borrowing like 
collateralized loans. This could be due to credit constraints, or because unsecured and secured 
loans are neither complements nor substitutes for our sample. Note that we again ignore loans 
larger than 50,000 pesos (thereby throwing out the largest 1% of formal sector loans), and here 
this restriction has some effect on the results: Appendix Table 2 shows that including all 
formal sector loans flips the sign and eliminates the significant treatment effect on loan 
amount. The effect on the number of loans get a bit weaker but remains significant at the 90% 
level. 
The third panel of Table 4 presents results on informal loans: those from friends and 
family, moneylenders, and borrowing circles. The point estimates are all negative, but do not 
indicate statistically significant decreases in informal debt outstanding in the month before the 
survey.
13 As discussed below, any reduction in informal borrowing seems to be the result of 
borrower choice rather than market constraints: Table 9 provides evidence that the treatment 
actually sharply increased access to informal borrowing. 
The final panel of Table 4 presents results on overall borrowing. Relative to the formal 
sector categories, the standard errors increase, and the point estimates decrease, so there are no 
statistically significant results. This is most likely due to a lack of precision (caused in part by 
adding noise from unaffected loan types), rather than a true null result of not finding 
statistically or economically meaningful increases in overall borrowing. 
Indeed, all of the above estimated treatment effects on borrowing are probably biased 
downward by borrower underreporting. More than half of respondents known, from the 
Lender’s data, to have a loan outstanding from the Lender in the month before the survey, do 
not report having a loan from the Lender (Appendix Table 3). Nearly half do not report any 
outstanding formal sector loan.
14 Prior evidence suggests that this level underreporting of 
unsecured debt is common in household surveys (Copestake et al. 2005; Karlan and Zinman 
2008; Jonathan Zinman 2009). Debt underreporting will bias the treatment effects on 
                                                 
12 The survey also collects some, albeit less detailed, information on borrowing over the last 12 months. We 
present these results in Appendix Table 1.  
13 Appendix Table 1 shows a statistically significant decrease in the likelihood of any informal sector loan over 
the last 12 months. 
14 Conversely, only 3% of households reported having a loan outstanding from the Lender that did not appear in 
the Lender’s administrative data.   13
borrowing outcomes downward if underreporting is more severe in levels in the treatment than 
in the control group.
15 
In all, the results on borrowing outcomes suggest that the treatment had some meaningful 
effects on borrowing. There is robust evidence that households who were assigned loans from 
the Lender shifted their borrowing composition towards formal sector loans like those offered 
by Lender. There is some evidence that this shift produced an overall increase in formal sector 
borrowing.  We cannot rule out significant increases in overall borrowing, and our ability to 
detect (larger) effects on all of the borrowing outcomes are probably biased downward by 
respondent underreporting of debt. We find some evidence that borrowing increases are larger 
for males than for females, and for lower-income than for higher-income households. 
 
C. Business Outcomes and Inputs, Table 5 
As discussed at the outset, the theory and practice of microcredit posit a broad set of 
treatment effects that are of more ultimate interest than those on borrowing. Given that most 
microlenders (including ours) target microentrepreneurs, we start with measures of business 
activity. 
Panel A presents intention-to-treat-effects on business “outcomes”. Profit is arguably the 
most important outcome, as it is arguably the closest thing we have to a summary statistic on 
the success of the business and its ability to generate resources for the household. The full 
sample point estimate on last month’s profits is positive and nontrivial in magnitude, but not 
statistically significant: a roughly $50 US increase, compared to a sample mean of about 
$500.
16 Dropping the top and bottom percentile of profit reports from the sample (including 96 
zeros) leaves the point estimate essentially unchanged, and reduces the standard error so that 
the p-value drops to 0.123. The point estimate on log profits is 0.05, but with standard error 
                                                 
15 This will happen even if both groups underreport in the same proportion, so long as the treatment group obtains 
more loans in actuality. This is easiest to see by considering the limiting cases. Say 50% of the treatment group 
and 0% in the control group obtain loans. If only half of those obtaining loans report them, the true treatment 
effect is 50 percentage points, but the estimated treatment effect is only 25 percentage points. Now say 100% of 
the treatment group and 50% of the control group obtains loans. If only half of those obtaining loans report them 
(as assumed in the first case), then the true treatment effect is 100-50=50 percentage points, while the estimated 
treatment effect will be only 100*0.5-50*0.5 = 25 percentage points. 
16 We measure profits using the response to the question: “What was the total income each business earned during 
the past month after paying all expenses including wages of employees, but not including any income or goods 
paid to yourself?  In other words, what were the profits of each business during the past month?” Including salary 
paid to the owner/operator does not materially change our measure of profits (this measure is correlated 0.97 with 
the measure based only on the profits question), or our estimates of treatment effects thereon.   14
0.10.
17 
The fact that microfinance often targets women, and the results in de Mel, McKenzie, and 
Woodruff (2008), suggest that it is important to explore gender differences in profitability. Our 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 5 show some evidence that is broadly in lines with de Mel et al. 
Profits increase for men, but less so and not statistically significantly for women. Each of the 
three profit point estimates for men are large, and statistically significant with at least 90% 
confidence. Each of the three point estimates for women are smaller and not statistically 
significant. However, if analyzed in one regression with an interaction term on female and 
treatment, the differences between the male and female profitability estimates are not 
significant at 90%. Furthermore, the small sample does not permit us to analyze whether the 
difference in returns for men and women is driven by social status, household bargaining, 
occupation/entrepreneurial choice, etc. Lastly, note that Table 4 suggests that larger profits 
may be an indicator of larger treatment effects on borrowing, rather than of higher returns to 
capital, for men. 
The results by income suggest that effects on profits may be larger for those with relatively 
high incomes (Column 4 vs. Column 5). This is noteworthy in part because Table 4 suggests 
that treatment effects on borrowing are actually larger for lower-income households.
18 Taken 
together the results in Table 4 and 5 suggest that returns to capital are higher for higher-income 
borrowers. 
Table 5 Panel A also presents results on another key business outcome, total revenues. The 
point estimates for all three functional forms are negative, but imprecisely estimated. 
Table 5 Panel B presents results for several measures of business “inputs” that, along with 
sales, we think of as proxies for the level and scope of business investment. The point 
estimates on inventory are imprecisely estimated, and sensitive to functional form. The other 
results here are surprising in that they point to decreases in the number of businesses,
19 and in 
the number of helpers in businesses owned by the household. The reduction in helpers is 
driven by paid (and non-household-member) employees.  
In all, Table 5 suggests that treated microentrepreneurs used credit to re-optimize business 
                                                 
17 We do not find any significant correlations between treatment status and (non)response to the profit question. 
18 Appendix Table 3 suggests that the larger effects on borrowing for relatively low-income households may be 
due in part to more severe debt underreporting by relatively high-income households. 
19 The likelihood of any reported business activity in the household is quite high, 0.93 in the full sample, which is 
not surprising since the sample frame is composed entirely of people who had been in business for at least one 
year at the time of application. We do not find any treatment effect on the likelihood of any business activity. 
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investment in a way that produced smaller, lower-cost, and more profitable businesses. Profits 
increase in an absolute sense, suggesting that many microentrepreneurs employ workers with 
negative net productivity, and raising the question of why (and in particular, of why access to 
credit led them to reduce employment and increase profits). The various results relating to risk 
management suggest an explanation that we discuss below (in sub-section G., and in the 
Conclusion). 
 
D. Human Capital and Occupational Choice, Table 6 
Table 6 presents estimated treatment effects on various types of human capital. The first 
row indicates no effect on the likelihood that the owner/operator has a second job. The second 
row shows a large but insignificant decrease in the likelihood that a household member helps 
in a family business. The next two rows show that household member employment in other 
businesses drops (significantly and sharply for households with a male applicant). The last row 
suggests that instead of work, more children are now in school: the likelihood of enrollment 
increases significantly (p-value = 0.061) in the male sub-sample. In all, the results suggest that 
(male) microentrepreneurs use loan proceeds to invest in human capital of their children, 
rather than in capital specific to their businesses. 
 
E. Non-Inventory Fixed Assets, Table 7 
The possibility remains that our focus on inventory and labor inputs has overlooked fixed-
capital investments in the business. Table 7 helps examine this, and does not find evidence of 
such investments. The first two rows present estimated treatment effects on the purchase or 
sale of many different types of non-inventory assets. We did not ask surveyors or respondents 
to distinguish between assets used for business or household production, given the nature of 
the non-inventory assets (computers, stoves, refrigerators, vehicles), and the closely-held 
nature of the businesses being studied. We do not find any significant effects in the full 
sample. The next rows present estimated treatment effects on surveyor observations of proxies 
for other types of investment. We find no full sample effects on building materials (wall, 
ceiling, or floor). The surveyor also recorded whether she observed a phone on the premises, 
and we do not find an effect on that either. 
Again, however, the absence of full sample effects should not obscure some potentially 
important heterogeneity. The quality of building materials drops significantly for treated males 
compared to controls. This suggests the treated males were reducing capital investment by   16
deferring maintenance, or by replacing worn-out roofs/walls/floors with lower-quality 
materials. Similarly, lower-income treated applicants have lower-quality roof material (the 
point estimates on the other two materials are also negative), and are also significantly less 
likely to have a phone. In all these results suggest that increased access to credit may lead 
some microentrepreneurs to re-optimize into lower level of capital inputs into their businesses. 
 
F. Other Household Investments and Risk Management, Table 8 
Table 8 presents treatment effects on the use of formal insurance, and on two other 
precautionary “investments” that plausibly relate to risk management: savings, and sending 
remittances.  
The results on formal insurance suggest that increased access to credit induces changes in 
risk management strategies. The effect on the likelihood of having health insurance is negative 
and insignificant in the full sample, with large and significant decreases in the male and 
higher-income sub-samples. The treatment effect on having any other insurance (life, home, 
property, fire, and car) is negative and significant in the full sample, with no evident 
differences across the sub-samples. The reductions in formal insurance are consistent with 
credit and formal insurance being substitutes, and/or with formal and informal insurance being 
substitutes; as documented directly below (Table 9), we find evidence of positive treatment 
effects on access to informal risk-sharing. 
We do not find any significant effects on savings and remittance outcomes, although our 
confidence intervals include large effects on either side of zero. 
 
G. Informal Risk-Sharing: Trust and Informal Access, Table 9 
Table 9 presents treatment effects that plausibly relate to informal risk-sharing. 
The first four outcomes are measures of local trust (Cleary and Stokes 2006). The point 
estimates are positive on three out of the four measures (indicating more trust), and the 
increase on “trust in your neighborhood” is significant. Effects again seem to be stronger for 
males and higher-income applicants. 
The next set of results point to increased access to financial assistance from friends or 
family in an emergency. We find no effects on the extensive margin (on a very high likelihood 
of being able to get any assistance: 0.9), but large and significant effects on the intensive 
margin: the ability to get 10,000 pesos of, or unlimited, assistance. Again, the effects are   17
largest for male and higher-income respondents.
20 
In all this table suggests that increased access to formal sector credit complements, rather 
than crowds-out, local and family risk-sharing mechanisms. Treated microentrepreneurs have 
more places to turn for formal and informal credit in a pinch, and consequently rely less on 
formal sector insurance (Table 8). They may also rely less on informal insurance; the reduced 
likelihood of employing unproductive workers suggested by Table 5 may be an indicator of 
this. The drop in outside employment at the household level (Table 6) can be interpreted in a 
similar vein, as reduced reliance on diversification. 
 
H. Household Income and Consumption, Table 10 
Table 10 examines whether any business profit increase (Table 5) translates into income 
and consumption changes. We look at four different functional forms of total household 
income and do not find any evidence that it increases, although our confidence intervals are 
wide. Nor do we find any significant effects on two key measures of consumption: food 
quality, and the likelihood of not visiting a doctor due to financial constraints. These "non-
results" could be due to a combination of the earlier noted effects: business profits increased, 
but outside employment decreased (with an increase in school attendance and perhaps related 
expenditures), thus leading to no change in total household income or consumption. 
 
I. Well-Being, Table 11 
Table 11 presents treatment effects on nine different measures of the self-reported well-
being, based on responses to standard batteries of questions on optimism, calmness, (lack of) 
worry, life satisfaction, work satisfaction, job stress, decision making power, and socio-
economic status (see Karlan and Zinman forthcoming for more details on these questions and 
their sources). In all cases higher values indicate better outcomes. We find no evidence of 
significant treatment effects on any of the individual measures. Examining sub-samples, we 
find only one effect: an increase in stress (i.e., a negative point estimate) for men.
21 Overall, 
nearly all of the point estimates are negative, however, and aggregating the nine outcomes into 
                                                 
20 Our results on other subjective questions suggest that the positive effects on trust and perceived access to 
financial assistance are not due to the treatment group being artificially sanguine in response to subjective 
questions. The average treatment effect on subjective well-being is negative (Table 11). 
 
21 Fernald, Hamad, Karlan, Ozer, and Zinman (2008) also find that increased access to produces higher stress, in 
South Africa.   18
a summary index (Karlan and Zinman forthcoming; Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007) leads to a 
marginally significant (p-value = 0.079) decrease for the full sample. The implied effect size is 
small: a 0.06 standard deviation decrease in the average well-being outcome. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Theories marshaled in support of microcredit expansion assume that small businesses are 
credit constrained, and predict that expanding access to microcredit will lead to business 
growth. Other theories show that expanding access to formal credit may have indirect but 
potentially important effects on risk-management strategies and opportunities. We test these 
theories, and estimate a broader set of impacts of a microcredit expansion, using a randomized 
trial implemented by a bank in Metro Manila. 
The first key result is that individuals assigned to the treatment group did borrow more 
than those in the control group, i.e., those rejected by this lender did not simply borrow from 
somewhere else. This expanded use of credit then drives our results on more ultimate 
outcomes. 
The first surprising result is that marginally creditworthy microentrepreneurs who 
randomly receive credit shrink their businesses relative to the control group. The treatment 
group also reports increased access to informal credit to absorb shocks (contrary to theories 
where formal credit may unintentionally crowd-out risk sharing arrangements by making it 
difficult to for those with better formal access to commit to reciprocation, e.g. see Conning 
and Udry (2005)). We also find that access to credit substitutes for formal insurance. 
We find two other noteworthy results. First, following de Mel et al (2008, forthcoming), 
we find some evidence that expanding access to capital (credit in our case) increases profits 
for male but not for female microentrepreneurs. Males seem to use these increased profits to 
send a child to school (and we find an accompanying decrease in household members 
employed outside the family business). Second, we find no evidence that increased access to 
credit improves well-being, as many microcredit advocates claim; rather, we find some 
evidence of a small decline in self-reported well-being.  
The results here have several implications. They provide tests of broad classes of theories, 
as noted above. They call into question the wisdom of microcredit policies that target women 
and microentrepreneurs to the exclusion of men and wage-earners. They highlight the 
importance of replicating tests of theories and programs across different settings. And they 
support the hypothesis that the household financial arrangements in developing countries are   19
complex (Collins et al. 2009), and hence that it is important to measure impacts on a broad set 
of behaviors, opportunity sets, and outcomes. Business outcomes are not a sufficient statistic 
for household welfare, nor even necessarily the locus of the biggest impacts of changing 
access to financial services. 
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Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Applicant is female 85% - 86% - 85% -
Applicant is married 78% - 53% - 82% -
Age of applicant 42.1 42.0 41.8 42.0 42.1 42.0
Education level of applicant
Primary 2% - 3% - 2% - 26% 43%
Some High School 4% - 7% - 4% -
Graduated High School 34% - 45% - 32% -
Some College 24% - 20% - 25% -
Graduated College 35% - 24% - 37% -
Household size 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0
Number of dependents 2.28 2 2.29 2 2.28 2
Applicant owns a sari-sari (corner) store 49% - 55% - 48% -
Monthly household income PhP64,866 PhP37,500 PhP58,239 PhP35,000 PhP65,979 PhP38,000 PhP25,917 PhP14,417
Number of businesses owned by household 1.15 1 1.20 1 1.14 1
Applicant's business has employees 25% - 17% - 26% -
Source for data on sample frame: Lender's application data
Sources for Manila and Philippines population:
Median income - http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/2006/fies0601r.htm
Education & household size - www.measuredhs.com
Exchange rate was approximately 50 PhP = $1 USD during our sample period.
Our Sample Frame
All (N = 1,601) Applicants with 60% 





Applicants with 80% 
chance of approval     
(N = 1,345)
All AllTable 2. Orthogonality of Treatment to Applicant Characteristics
Dependent Variable: 1 = Loan Assigned 1 = Surveyed 1 = Loan Assigned
sample: frame frame surveyed=1




Marital status -- Married -0.004 -0.006
(0.037) (0.048)
Marital Status -- Widowed / separated  0.003 0.056
(0.046) (0.057)
Number of dependents -0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.008)
Age of applicant 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
Education -- Some college -0.001 -0.026
(0.025) (0.031)
Education -- Graduated high school -0.020 -0.010
(0.025) (0.029)
Education -- Some high school -0.031 0.008
(0.060) (0.063)
Education -- Elementary school 0.008 0.052
(0.070) (0.073)
Primary business location -- Poblacion 0.016 0.036
(0.028) (0.033)
Primary business location -- Public market -0.013 0.007
(0.033) (0.041)
Primary business property arrangement -- Lease 0.013 0.018
(0.039) (0.053)
Primary business property arrangement -- Rent -0.009 -0.024
(0.027) (0.034)
Primary business type -- Small grocery/convenience store -0.029 0.001
(0.028) (0.034)
Primary business type -- Wholesale 0.023 -0.006
(0.043) (0.059)
Primary business type -- Service 0.004 0.017
(0.035) (0.043)
Primary business type -- Manufacturing (not food processing) -0.133* -0.186*
(0.078) (0.100)
Primary business type -- Food vending -0.028 -0.029
(0.038) -0.047
No regular employees in primary business 0.028 0.003
(0.031) -0.039
One regular employee in primary business 0.047 0.028
(0.037) -0.048
Log of years primary business in business 0.011 -0.017
(0.014) (0.016)
Log of net weekly cash flow  0.000 -0.006
(0.013) (0.015)
Randomized loan decision 0.004
(0.030)
Test linear hypotheses of independent variables F(22, 1576) = 0.67 F(22, 1089) = 0.71
(Probability > F) 0.875 0.836
Number of Observations 1600 1601 1113
 
OLS with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses -- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sample frame contains
1,601 marginal applicants eligible for the treatment (i.e., for loan approval). One observation dropped from column (1) due to primary business
having been in business for zero years. Each column represents the dependent variable listed in the column heading regressed on a set of covariates
comprised of: 1) the right-hand-side variables listed in the row headings; 2) a dummy variable to differentiate between the lower and upper random
approval rates (60% and 85%). 'Single' is the omitted marital status category. 'College graduate' is the omitted educational attainment variable.
'Barangay[neighborhood]'is the omitted primary business location variable. 'Own'is the omitted primary business property arrangement. 'Other retail)'
is the omitted primary business type variable.Table 3. Treatment Assignment and Treatment Status









Randomizer says to: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Reject no 324 114 210
Reject yes 5 0.98 1 0.99 4 0.98
total assigned Reject 329 115 214
Approve yes 921 81 840
Approve no 351 0.72 60 0.57 291 0.74
total assigned Approve 1272 141 1131
total reached for survey 1601 256 1345









Randomizer says to: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Reject no 218 72 146
Reject yes 4 0.98 1 0.99 3 0.98
total assigned Reject 222 73 149
Approve yes 650 50 600
Approve no 241 0.73 38 0.57 203 0.75
total assigned Approve 891 88 803
total reached for survey 1113 161 952
Sample includes everyone reached for follow-up survey (Table 2 shows that being reached is uncorrelated with treatment assignment). "Compliance" rate
does not have normative meaning: it simply refers to the proportion of application dispositions that matched the random assignment. Noncompliance with
"approve" assignment was due to one of two unobservable reasons: 1) branch did not approve the loan despite the credit scoring software's instruction to
approve; 2) branch did approve the loan, but the applicant ultimately chose not to take it.
Full sample 60% treatment probability 85% treatment probability
60% treatment probability 85% treatment probability Full sampleTable 4: Intention-to-Treat Effects on Borrowing in Month Before Survey
FORMAL SECTOR LOANS FROM TREATING 
LENDER OR CLOSE SUBSTITUTES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
   Any outstanding loan <= 50,000 pesos 0.096*** 0.078*** 0.163*** 0.105*** 0.084***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.045) (0.034) (0.030)
[0.145] [0.149] [0.122] [0.150] [0.139]
   Level loan size for loans <=50,000 pesos 2,155.95*** 1,790.57*** 3,107.73*** 2,911.40*** 1,172.90***
(435.58) (490.89) (988.21) (741.68) (404.95)
[2,585.90] [2,529.72] [2,908.54] [3,188.07] [1,983.73]
   Number of loans <=50,000 pesos 0.108*** 0.090*** 0.164*** 0.121*** 0.088***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.046) (0.038) (0.030)
[0.151] [0.155] [0.128] [0.157] [0.145]
ALL FORMAL SECTOR LOANS
   Any outstanding loan <= 50,000 pesos 0.015 0.003 0.089 -0.003 0.048
(0.038) (0.043) (0.088) (0.056) (0.054)
[0.408] [0.419] [0.341] [0.394] [0.421]
   Level loan size for loans <=50,000 pesos 2,344.58** 1,979.24* 4,321.26** 1,968.02 3,006.18***
(920.87) (1,056.14) (1,675.83) (1,553.80) (946.55)
[7,202.26] [7,371.87] [6,228.05] [7,706.51] [6,698.01]
   Number of loans <=50,000 pesos 0.094** 0.081 0.151* 0.070 0.132**
(0.045) (0.052) (0.086) (0.069) (0.060)
[0.445] [0.466] [0.323] [0.427] [0.463]
ALL INFORMAL SECTOR LOANS
   Any outstanding loan <= 50,000 pesos -0.036 -0.036 -0.025 -0.064 -0.006
(0.035) (0.039) (0.084) (0.053) (0.049)
[0.246] [0.241] [0.274] [0.253] [0.239]
   Level loan size for loans <=50,000 pesos -786.03 -570.26 -1,296.70 -1,345.64 -390.37
(728.76) (777.11) (2,224.04) (1,255.21) (692.15)
[3,161.48] [2,891.83] [4,710.37] [3,907.78] [2,415.19]
   Number of loans <=50,000 pesos -0.011 -0.008 -0.013 -0.052 0.032
(0.042) (0.046) (0.103) (0.061) (0.057)
[0.273] [0.268] [0.305] [0.284] [0.262]
ALL LOAN TYPES
   Any outstanding loan <= 50,000 pesos 0.003 -0.008 0.045 -0.048 0.061
(0.039) (0.044) (0.094) (0.056) (0.056)
[0.538] [0.550] [0.470] [0.528] [0.548]
   Level loan size for loans <=50,000 pesos 1,525.85 1,367.62 3,024.56 590.88 2,625.81**
(1,236.80) (1,392.07) (2,954.26) (2,099.08) (1,202.42)
[10,456.78] [10,372.93] [10,938.41] [11,778.12] [9,135.44]
   Number of loans <=50,000 pesos 0.066 0.053 0.138 -0.009 0.164*
(0.066) (0.075) (0.138) (0.098) (0.089)
[0.733] [0.752] [0.628] [0.734] [0.732]
Number of Observations 1106 942 164 553 553
OLS with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses -- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% -- followed by the mean of the dependent variable in
brackets. Each cell presents the estimate intention-to-treat effect (i.e., the result on the treatment assignment variable) for the borrowing outcome in that row, and the (sub)-
sample in that column. All results are conditional on the randomization conditions (credit score cut-offs), appication month, application year, survey month, and survey year.
"Formal" sector loans are defined as loans from commercial, thrift, and rural banks (including mortgages), lending organizations, NGOs, cooperatives, and employers (including
salary advances). "Informal" sector loans are defined as loans from paluwagans (savings groups), bombays (moneylenders), 5-6ers (borrow 5, repay 6), family, and friends.
"All" loan types are defined as formal and informal sector loans, plus loans from pawnshops. "Close substitutes" to the treating lender are defined as formal sector lenders with





incomeTable 5: Intention-to-Treat Effects on Business Outcomes and Inputs
Panel A. Business Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Profit  in All Household Businesses in 2,482.57 2,225.37 12,665.61* 4,795.85 680.30
Month Before Survey: Profit Directly Reported (2,114.02) (2,407.01) (7,642.53) (3,700.34) (2,338.35)
[17,074.62] [16,622.81] [19,610.35] [21,807.33] [12,341.91]
1,058 898 160 529 529
Total Profit  in All Household Businesses in  2,340.28 2,623.66 7,363.89* 4,488.16** 126.14
Month Before Survey: Profit Directly Reported (1,515.42) (1,787.34) (3,792.71) (2,215.95) (2,163.64)
(trim top and bottom percentiles) [16,945.48] [16,725.04] [18,167.06] [19,543.59] [14,211.52]
942 798 144 483 459
Log of Total Profit  in All Household Businesses  0.052 0.054 0.370* 0.115 0.017
in Month Before Survey: Profit Directly Reported (0.096) (0.110) (0.205) (0.130) (0.147)
[9.178] [9.142] [9.378] [9.349] [8.996]
952 807 145 490 462
Total Sales in All Household Businesses in Month -4,312.06 -756.70 -10,083.69 -2,471.65 -3,689.99
Before Survey  (7,008.00) (7,811.85) (16,312.34) (11,417.31) (8,192.00)
[57,319.51] [56,822.15] [60,148.28] [72,459.45] [42,065.95]
1,070 910 160 537 533
Total Sales in All Household Businesses in Month -3,025.70 1,885.65 -16,803.87 -244.54 -4,502.10
Before Survey (trim top and bottom percentiles) (6,333.55) (6,843.71) (16,173.31) (9,011.81) (9,064.00)
[56,691.95] [55,597.53] [62,977.26] [66,293.45] [46,499.27]
971 827 144 500 471
Log of Total Sales in All Household Businesses  -0.017 0.045 -0.076 -0.008 0.005
in Month Before Survey  (0.101) (0.111) (0.228) (0.150) (0.134)
[10.389] [10.361] [10.551] [10.531] [10.237]
981 836 145 509 472
Panel B. Business Inputs
Total Current Market Value of Inventory in All -10,913.01 -12,789.48 1,742.90 -29,714.05 5,628.68
Household Businesses (15,736.38) (18,852.11) (28,541.58) (30,374.65) (10,374.67)
[43,572.77] [39,185.56] [69,395.46] [59,300.97] [27,534.96]
1,026 877 149 518 508
Total Current Market Value of Inventory in All 788.92 3,748.44 9,397.44 4,037.93 -5,227.20
Household Businesses (trim top and bottom (7,072.32) (6,118.18) (29,748.70) (11,287.38) (7,902.10)
percentiles) [36,594.43] [30,894.93] [70,158.13] [47,344.36] [25,440.75]
868 742 126 442 426
Log of Total Current Market Value of Inventory  0.039 0.077 0.207 0.090 -0.059
in All Household Businesses  (0.152) (0.166) (0.469) (0.226) (0.206)
[9.278] [9.243] [9.483] [9.525] [9.019]
878 751 127 450 428
Number of Businesses in Household -0.102* -0.062 -0.277 -0.073 -0.139
(0.060) (0.061) (0.172) (0.073) (0.100)
[1.282] [1.287] [1.255] [1.282] [1.282]
1,113 948 165 556 557
Number of Helpers in All Household  -0.261* -0.156 -0.645 -0.451** -0.111
Businesses (0.134) (0.137) (0.411) (0.223) (0.140)
[1.051] [1.022] [1.212] [1.298] [0.805]
1,104 939 165 551 553
Number of Paid Helpers (not Including In-kind -0.273** -0.248* -0.276 -0.397* -0.181
Contributions) in All Household Businesses (0.123) (0.130) (0.321) (0.208) (0.124)
[0.698] [0.659] [0.921] [0.953] [0.443]
1,113 948 165 556 557
Number of Unpaid Helpers (not Including In-kind 0.028 0.106* -0.367 -0.059 0.097
Contributions) in All Household Businesses (0.071) (0.058) (0.290) (0.115) (0.082)
[0.312] [0.315] [0.297] [0.291] [0.334]
1,113 948 165 556 557
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell presents the OLS estimate on the variable for 1= assigned a loan. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Mean
of the dependent variable in brackets. Number of observations is listed below mean. All regressions include controls for the probability of assignment to
treatment (60% or 85%), survey month, survey year, application month, and application year. All sample restrictions based on application data. To determine
profits, we asked: "What was the total income each business earned during the past month after paying all expenses including wages of employees, but not





incomeTable 6: Intention-to-Treat Effects on Other Human Capital and Occupational Choice
Business Owner/Operator has Second Job Outside  -0.006 -0.001 -0.065 -0.025 0.011
the Business (0.029) (0.031) (0.085) (0.043) (0.039)
[0.176] [0.160] [0.267] [0.178] [0.174]
1,113 948 165 556 557
Any Household Member Helping in Family -0.058 -0.058 -0.001 -0.066 -0.036
Business (0.039) (0.044) (0.096) (0.054) (0.056)
[0.525] [0.505] [0.636] [0.588] [0.461]
1,113 948 165 556 557
Any Household Member Employed Outside the  -0.047 -0.022 -0.230** -0.078 -0.019
Family Business (0.039) (0.044) (0.096) (0.055) (0.056)
[0.527] [0.540] [0.455] [0.480] [0.575]
1,113 948 165 556 557
Any Overseas Foreign Workers in Household -0.013 -0.004 -0.060 0.002 -0.028
(0.019) (0.021) (0.050) (0.023) (0.033)
[0.058] [0.062] [0.036] [0.043] [0.074]
1,113 948 165 556 557
Any Students in Household -0.014 -0.043 0.168* -0.051 0.017
(0.033) (0.035) (0.089) (0.045) (0.049)
[0.758] [0.763] [0.733] [0.764] [0.752]
1,113 948 165 556 557
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell presents the OLS estimate on the variable for 1= assigned a loan. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.
Mean of the dependent variable in brackets. Number of observations is listed below mean. All regressions include controls for the probability of
assignment to treatment (60% or 85%), survey month, survey year, application month, and application year. All sample restrictions based on application





incomeTable 7: Intention-to-Treat Effects on Non-Inventory Fixed Assets
Purchased Any Assets in 12 Months Prior to  0.023 0.034 -0.033 0.088* -0.037
Survey (0.033) (0.037) (0.080) (0.047) (0.048)
[0.245] [0.252] [0.207] [0.265] [0.226]
1,104 940 164 551 553
Sold Any Assets in 12 Months Prior to Survey -0.014 -0.021 0.032 -0.020 -0.013
(0.020) (0.022) (0.057) (0.029) (0.028)
[0.070] [0.068] [0.085] [0.062] [0.078]
1,095 931 164 546 549
Wall Material is Finished Concrete (omitted:  0.014 0.044 -0.155* 0.072 -0.059
semi- or unfinished concrete, wood, plain GI sheet,  (0.039) (0.043) (0.091) (0.056) (0.055)
salvaged or scrap materials, and bamboo) [0.536] [0.531] [0.570] [0.558] [0.515]
1,113 948 165 556 557
Floor Material is Marble or Finished Concrete -0.013 0.038 -0.219*** 0.032 -0.071
(omitted: ceramic or vinyl tiles, unfinished concrete,  (0.036) (0.040) (0.076) (0.051) (0.052)
wood, earth, sand, and bamboo) [0.687] [0.684] [0.709] [0.701] [0.673]
1,113 948 165 556 557
Roof Material is Concrete Slab or Metal Sheet -0.010 0.021 -0.138*** 0.041 -0.080**
(omitted: tiles, salvaged or scrap, and other) (0.027) (0.031) (0.052) (0.039) (0.036)
[0.872] [0.868] [0.891] [0.879] [0.864]
1,113 948 165 556 557
Owns a Phone (landline and/or cell phone) -0.040 -0.041 0.019 0.016 -0.090**
(0.029) (0.031) (0.066) (0.041) (0.041)
[0.828] [0.826] [0.838] [0.838] [0.817]
1,079 919 160 544 535
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Each cell presents the OLS estimate on the variable for 1= assigned a loan. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Mean of
the dependent variable in brackets. Number of observations is listed below mean. All regressions include controls for the probability of assignment to treatment
(60% or 85%), survey month, survey year, application month, and application year. All sample restrictions based on application data. Lower randomization





incomeTable 8: Intention-to-Treat Effects on Other Household Investments and Risk Management
Any Health Insurance -0.035 -0.014 -0.185** -0.117** 0.039
(0.038) (0.043) (0.092) (0.052) (0.057)
[0.644] [0.645] [0.636] [0.640] [0.648]
1,112 947 165 555 557
Any Other Type of Insurance -0.079** -0.070 -0.121 -0.101* -0.071
(0.039) (0.043) (0.095) (0.056) (0.055)
[0.436] [0.433] [0.454] [0.473] [0.400]
1,105 942 163 552 553
Any Savings in Household 0.002 -0.008 0.059 0.072 -0.088
(0.039) (0.043) (0.096) (0.055) (0.054)
[0.600] [0.597] [0.616] [0.656] [0.545]
1,108 944 164 552 556
Any Remittances Sent by Household 0.009 -0.015 0.096 -0.033 0.050
(0.034) (0.038) (0.073) (0.049) (0.047)
[0.235] [0.237] [0.226] [0.245] [0.225]
1,106 942 164 554 552
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Each cell presents the OLS estimate on the variable for 1= assigned a loan. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Mean of
the dependent variable in brackets. Number of observations is listed below mean. All regressions include controls for the probability of assignment to treatment
(60% or 85%), survey month, survey year, application month, and application year. All sample restrictions based on application data. Lower randomization





incomeTable 9: Intention-to-Treat Effects on Trust & Informal Access
Ordered Probit
Trust that you would not be taken advantage of you -0.060 -0.087 0.056 0.023 -0.163
(1= People would take advantage, 10= People  (0.082) (0.092) (0.183) (0.113) (0.118)
would be fair) [7.596] [7.584] [7.665] [7.569] [7.623]
1,107 943 164 552 555
Trust in your neighborhood 0.209** 0.186* 0.382* 0.511*** -0.036
( -4 = No trust, -1 = Complete trust) (0.090) (0.099) (0.215) (0.132) (0.119)
[-2.147] [-2.153] [-2.109] [-2.141] [-2.153]
1,110 945 165 554 556
Trust in people you know personally 0.036 -0.007 0.255 0.219* -0.121
( -4 = No trust, -1 = Complete trust) (0.093) (0.102) (0.222) (0.133) (0.130)
[-1.899] [-1.903] [-1.879] [-1.917] [-1.881]
1,110 945 165 554 556
Trust in your business associates 0.101 0.066 0.300 0.157 0.048
( -4 = No trust, -1 = Complete trust) (0.089) (0.101) (0.188) (0.131) (0.122)
[-2.179] [-2.178] [-2.184] [-2.185] [-2.173]
1,105 942 163 551 554
OLS
Could get financial assistance from family or  0.010 -0.005 0.087 0.020 0.002
friends in an emergency. (0.027) (0.030) (0.068) (0.037) (0.042)
[0.895] [0.889] [0.934] [0.902] [0.889]
995 844 151 499 496
Could get 10,000 pesos-worth of financial  0.102*** 0.084* 0.168* 0.168*** 0.047
assistance from family or friends in an emergency. (0.040) (0.044) (0.100) (0.058) (0.055)
[0.447] [0.447] [0.450] [0.517] [0.377]
995 844 151 499 496
Could get unlimited financial assistance from  0.090** 0.071* 0.161* 0.130** 0.057
family or friends in an emergency. (0.035) (0.040) (0.086) (0.053) (0.048)
[0.322] [0.322] [0.318] [0.351] [0.292]
995 844 151 499 496
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. For the first four outcome measures -- all relating to trust -- each cell presents the ordered probit estimate on the variable for
1=assigned a loan. For the last two outcome measures and the summary index, each cell presents the OLS estimate on the variable for 1= assigned a loan. Huber-
White standard errors in parentheses. Mean of the dependent variable in brackets, followed by the number of observations. All regressions include controls for the
probability of assignment to treatment (60% or 85%), survey month, survey year, application month, and application year. All sample restrictions based on
application data. Lower randomization window corresponds to a 60% probability of assignment to treatment. Higher randomization window corresponds to 85%





income Male FemaleTable 10: Intention-to-Treat Effects on Household Income and Consumption
Total Income in Household in Last Month -3,574.05 -1,043.00 -11,652.46 551.72 -5,238.25
(7,287.46) (8,282.06) (14,542.11) (12,647.67) (7,951.41)
[64,447.18] [65,302.00] [59,505.25] [79,993.06] [49,269.42]
1,085 925 160 536 549
Total Income in Household in Last Month  (trim  -35.03 3,591.43 -14,941.27 7,087.84 -5,590.14
top and bottom percentiles) (5,966.72) (6,589.83) (15,227.09) (8,800.49) (8,208.28)
[60,569.57] [60,556.82] [60,642.29] [71,342.96] [50,276.78]
1,052 895 157 514 538
Log of Total Income in Household in Last Month -0.078 -0.046 -0.188 -0.051 -0.104
(0.086) (0.095) (0.208) (0.134) (0.110)
[10.525] [10.515] [10.576] [10.676] [10.378]
1,062 905 157 524 538
Household Is Above Poverty Line 0.019 0.020 0.036 0.019 0.007
(0.024) (0.027) (0.056) (0.036) (0.033)
[0.904] [0.900] [0.925] [0.909] [0.898]
1,078 919 159 530 548
Any Remittances Received by Household  -0.001 -0.024 0.037 0.054 -0.061
(0.038) (0.042) (0.089) (0.052) (0.055)
[0.346] [0.359] [0.268] [0.338] [0.354]
1,107 943 164 554 553
Food Quality Has Improved in the Last 12 Months 0.002 -0.006 0.104 -0.016 0.020
(0.040) (0.044) (0.103) (0.057) (0.056)
[0.497] [0.491] [0.533] [0.514] [0.479]
1,113 948 165 556 557
No One in Household Prevented from Visiting -0.002 0.009 -0.095 0.002 0.002
Doctor Due to Financial Constraints (0.032) (0.036) (0.074) (0.047) (0.042)
[0.793] [0.790] [0.809] [0.789] [0.797]
1,088 926 162 540 548
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Each cell presents the OLS estimate on the variable for 1= assigned a loan. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Mean of
the dependent variable in brackets. Number of observations is listed below mean. All regressions include controls for the probability of assignment to treatment
(60% or 85%), survey month, survey year, application month, and application year. All sample restrictions based on application data. Lower randomization





incomeTable 11: Intention-to-Treat Effects on Subjective Well-Being Measures
Optimism (Scale: 6-30, low-to-high) -0.123 0.073 -0.809 -0.296 0.033
(0.229) (0.251) (0.555) (0.317) (0.340)
[22.216] [22.164] [22.515] [22.437] [21.996]
1,105 940 165 551 554
Calmness (Scale: 1-6, low-to-high) -0.075 -0.105 0.150 -0.063 -0.067
(0.095) (0.107) (0.237) (0.140) (0.136)
[2.499] [2.473] [2.644] [2.488] [2.509]
1,095 932 163 543 552
No Worry (1 = Has not had a month in the -0.007 0.001 -0.084 0.060 -0.050
past year during which respondent felt (0.038) (0.043) (0.094) (0.055) (0.054)
mostly worried) [0.566] [0.561] [0.595] [0.565] [0.567]
1,094 931 163 542 552
Life Satisfaction (Scale: 1-4, 1=Not at All, 0.016 -0.034 0.159 0.073 -0.034
 4=Very) (0.063) (0.068) (0.162) (0.093) (0.088)
[2.827] [2.830] [2.806] [2.880] [2.773]
1,108 943 165 552 556
Job Satisfaction (Scale: 1-10, -0.012 -0.068 0.169 -0.022 0.007
low-to-high) (0.137) (0.149) (0.355) (0.191) (0.201)
[6.615] [6.599] [6.709] [6.658] [6.573]
1102 937 165 549 553
Job Stress (Scale: -12 to 0 : 0 = no stress, -0.190 0.042 -0.993* -0.369 -0.024
 -12 = always stressed, tired, prevented  (0.227) (0.257) (0.524) (0.313) (0.325)
from giving time to family/partner) [-6.829] [-6.845] [-6.738] [-6.432] [-7.221]
1,062 902 160 528 534
Decision Making Power (Scale: 0-26, -0.233 -0.290 -0.033 -0.367 -0.033
low-to-high) (0.302) (0.360) (0.530) (0.437) (0.438)
[10.384] [10.480] [9.902] [10.453] [10.317]
797 665 132 393 404
Place on Socio-Economic Ladder Compared  -0.077 -0.050 -0.285 -0.058 -0.065
to Others in Village (1-10) (0.101) (0.112) (0.259) (0.146) (0.144)
[5.690] [5.684] [5.727] [5.803] [5.578]
1110 945 165 553 557
Place on Socio-Economic Ladder Compared -0.162 -0.186 -0.146 -0.177 -0.127
to Others in Philippines (1-10) (0.122) (0.134) (0.319) (0.170) (0.180)
[4.947] [4.942] [4.976] [5.067] [4.828]
1110 945 165 553 557
Summary Index of above outcomes; -0.053* -0.046 -0.108 -0.050 -0.042
coefficients in standard deviation units of average (0.030) (0.033) (0.084) (0.043) (0.043)
outcome [-0.034] [-0.043] [0.022] [0.017] [-0.084]
1,113 948 165 556 557
All
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Each cell presents the OLS estimate on the variable for 1= assigned a loan. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Mean of
the dependent variable in brackets. Number of observations is listed below mean. All regressions include controls for the probability of assignment to treatment
(60% or 85%), survey month, survey year, application month, and application year. All sample restrictions based on application data. Lower randomization
window corresponds to a 60% probability of assignment to treatment. Higher randomization window corresponds to 85% probability of assignment to treatment.
"Has Employees"corresponds to having one or more full time salaried employees. Sample for decision making power scale is all individuals that are either "married
& living with partner" or "not married, but living with partner" (excludes: "single,""divorced/separated," "not living with partner, but married," and "widowed").Six




income Male FemaleAppendix Table 1. Intention-to-Treat Effects on Borrowing Over the Last 12 Months (compare to Table 4)
Full Sample
Female Male High Low
ALL FORMAL SECTOR LOANS
   Any outstanding loan 0.014 -0.005 0.110 0.004 0.038
(0.035) (0.037) (0.103) (0.050) (0.050)
[0.741] [0.760] [0.636] [0.740] [0.743]
   Number of loans 0.278* 0.294* 0.051 0.178 0.409**
(0.153) (0.157) (0.424) (0.239) (0.196)
[1.991] [2.077] [1.494] [1.994] [1.987]
ALL INFORMAL SECTOR LOANS
   Any outstanding loan -0.087** -0.085* -0.101 -0.093 -0.068
(0.040) (0.044) (0.100) (0.057) (0.057)
[0.445] [0.436] [0.494] [0.450] [0.439]
   Number of loans -0.016 0.045 -0.452 -0.777** 0.761*
(0.286) (0.311) (0.614) (0.360) (0.429)
[1.571] [1.580] [1.519] [1.408] [1.732]
ALL LOAN TYPES
   Any outstanding loan -0.036 -0.041* -0.020 -0.060** -0.005
(0.024) (0.025) (0.068) (0.028) (0.039)
[0.887] [0.895] [0.846] [0.898] [0.877]
   Number of loans 0.208 0.308 -0.587 -0.649 1.133**
(0.331) (0.352) (0.821) (0.445) (0.483)
[3.647] [3.745] [3.080] [3.521] [3.772]
   Attempted to avail a loan but was denied  -0.064** -0.058* -0.107 -0.099** -0.035
(0.029) (0.031) (0.065) (0.043) (0.037)
[0.051] [0.049] [0.220] [0.080] [0.068]
Number of Observations 1102 940 162 549 553
In Last 12 Months Before Survey
Gender Income
OLS with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses -- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% -- followed by the mean of the dependent variable in brackets.
Each cell presents the estimate intention-to-treat effect (i.e., the result on the treatment assignment variable) for the borrowing outcome in that row, and the (sub)-sample in that column.
All results are conditional on the randomization conditions (credit score cut-offs), appication month, application year, survey month, and survey year. "Formal" sector loans are defined
as loans from commercial, thrift, and rural banks (including mortgages), lending organizations, NGOs, cooperatives, and employers (including salary advances). "Informal" sector loans
are defined as loans from paluwagans (savings groups), bombays (moneylenders), 5-6ers (borrow 5, repay 6), family, and friends. "All" loan types are defined as formal and informal
sector loans, plus loans from pawnshops. "Close substitutes" to the treating lender are defined as formal sector lenders with no collateral or group requirements, listed as either a rural
bank or microlender by the MIX Market and/or Microfinance Council of the Philippines.  Survey did not collect loan amount for loans obtained in last 12 months, only for loans outstandiAppendix Table 2. Intention-to-Treat Effects on Borrowing, Including Loans >50,000 Pesos (compare to Table 4)
Full Sample
Female Male High Low
FORMAL SECTOR LOANS FROM TREATING 
LENDER OR CLOSE SUBSTITUTES
   Any outstanding loan 0.095*** 0.073*** 0.162*** 0.100*** 0.089***
(0.023) (0.027) (0.047) (0.037) (0.030)
[0.152] [0.155] [0.134] [0.163] [0.141]
   Level loan size for loans 2,028.08*** 1,223.35 3,052.13* 2,667.23** 1,172.90***
(727.01) (817.43) (1,556.42) (1,344.72) (404.95)
[3,098.55] [2,924.63] [4,097.56] [4,213.38] [1,983.73]
   Number of loans 0.107*** 0.085*** 0.163*** 0.116*** 0.094***
(0.025) (0.030) (0.049) (0.041) (0.031)
[0.158] [0.161] [0.140] [0.170] [0.146]
ALL FORMAL SECTOR LOANS
   Any outstanding loan -0.012 -0.035 0.098 -0.041 0.033
(0.039) (0.043) (0.089) (0.056) (0.055)
[0.447] [0.458] [0.384] [0.454] [0.439]
   Level loan size for loans -12,897.48 -19,209.21 9,141.22** -32,661.53 7,169.05
(11,914.05) (14,686.34) (3,671.51) (24,393.09) (5,942.06)
[17,375.86] [18,382.48] [11,593.90] [21,778.84] [12,972.88]
   Number of loans 0.080* 0.044 0.215** 0.044 0.129**
(0.048) (0.054) (0.094) (0.073) (0.063)
[0.496] [0.515] [0.390] [0.503] [0.490]
ALL INFORMAL SECTOR LOANS
   Any outstanding loan -0.031 -0.033 -0.022 -0.054 -0.006
(0.036) (0.039) (0.084) (0.053) (0.049)
[0.255] [0.251] [0.280] [0.269] [0.241]
   Level loan size for loans -185.48 -123.23 -745.53 -37.57 -286.94
(964.36) (1,049.37) (2,538.67) (1,761.03) (705.85)
[4,147.02] [3,889.70] [5,625.00] [5,770.34] [2,523.69]
   Number of loans -0.004 -0.001 -0.009 -0.039 0.034
(0.042) (0.046) (0.103) (0.062) (0.057)
[0.285] [0.280] [0.311] [0.304] [0.266]
ALL LOAN TYPES
   Any outstanding loan -0.008 -0.033 0.086 -0.066 0.056
(0.039) (0.043) (0.095) (0.055) (0.056)
[0.577] [0.590] [0.590] [0.591] [0.564]
   Level loan size for loans -13,115.67 -19,373.79 8,395.69* -32,730.60 6,892.10
(11,950.08) (14,717.77) (4,957.05) (24,470.65) (5,984.25)
[21,615.91] [22,381.42] [17,218.90] [27,713.02] [15,518.81]
   Number of loans 0.059 0.023 0.206 -0.023 0.163*
(0.067) (0.076) (0.142) (0.101) (0.091)
[0.797] [0.813] [0.701] [0.830] [0.763]
Number of Observations 1106 942 164 553 553
In Month Before Survey
Gender Income
OLS with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses -- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% -- followed by the mean of the dependent variable in brackets.  Each 
cell presents the estimate intention-to-treat effect (i.e., the result on the treatment assignment variable) for the borrowing outcome in that row, and the (sub)-sample in that column.  All result
are conditional on the randomization conditions (credit score cut-offs), appication month, application year, survey month, and survey year.  "Formal" sector loans are defined as loans from 
commercial, thrift, and rural banks (including mortgages), lending organizations, NGOs, cooperatives, and employers (including salary advances).  "Informal" sector loans are defined as 
loans from paluwagans (savings groups), bombays (loan sharks), 5-6ers (borrow 5, repay 6), family, and friends.  "All" loan types are defined as formal and informal sector loans, plus loans 
from pawnshops.  "Close substitutes" to the treating lender are defined as formal sector lenders with no collateral or group requirements, listed as either a rural bank or microlender by the 
MIX Market and/or Microfinance Council of the Philippines.  Appendix Table 3. Debt Underreporting
Mean Number of Loans  Mean Number of Loans 
Proportion Borrowing 
from Participating 
Lender, Self-report from 
Survey
Proportion Borrowing 
from Participating Lender, 
Administrative Data
T-test for Difference and 





report from Participating Lender, 
Administrative Data
T-test for Difference 
(Standard Error) 
All 0.114 0.243 0.129 0.116 0.279 0.164
[1,106] [1,106] (0.012) [1,106] [1,106] (0.014)
Above Median Income 0.127 0.289 0.163 0.130 0.325 0.195
[553] [553] (0.019) [553] [553] (0.022)
Below Median Income 0.101 0.197 0.096 0.101 0.233 0.132
[553] [553] (0.015) [553] [553] (0.018)
Male Respondent 0.122 0.183 0.061 0.122 0.195 0.073
[164] [164] (0.031) [164] [164] (0.033)
Female Respondent 0.113 0.254 0.141 0.115 0.294 0.179
[942] [942] (0.013) [942] [942] (0.016)
Male Surveyor 0.119 0.232 0.112 0.122 0.266 0.144
[730] [730] (0.015) [730] [730] (0.018)
Female Surveyor 0.105 0.263 0.159 0.105 0.304 0.199
[372] [372] (0.020) [372] [372] (0.024)
Gender Matched: Respondent and Survey 0.113 0.238 0.126 0.113 0.276 0.163
[453] [453] (0.018) [453] [453] (0.021)
Gender Mismatched 0.116 0.245 0.132 0.119 0.280 0.162
[649] [649] (0.016) [649] [649] (0.019)
Male Respondent and Male Surveyor 0.131 0.164 0.033 0.131 0.180 0.049
[122] [122] (0.035) [122] [122] (0.038)
Male Respondent and Female Surveyor 0.098 0.244 0.146 0.098 0.244 0.146
[41] [41] (0.066) [41] [41] (0.066)
Female Respondent and Female Surveyor 0.106 0.266 0.160 0.106 0.311 0.205
[331] [331] (0.022) [331] [331] (0.025)
Female Respondent and Male Surveyor 0.117 0.245 0.128 0.120 0.283 0.163
[608] [608] (0.016) [608] [608] (0.020)
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  Four observations are dropped for surveyor gender-related measures due to missing information.
IN MONTH BEFORE THE SURVEY
Loan From Lender Number of Loans From Lender